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that the attractiveness of the object is an element only to the extent that
it helps answer this question: "Did the landowner know or by reason-
able care could he have known that children were likely to trespass on
a part of the land upon which he maintained a condition likely to be
dangerous to them because of their childish propensities to intermeddle
or otherwise ?,,37
The principal case, while in harmony with the reasoning of past
decisions and while the result seems equitable, continues what is sub-
mitted as an undesirable precedent by classifying certain instrumental-
ities as attractive or dangerous instead of clearly recognizing that
liability should rest primarily upon foreseeability of injury to a child
whose presence should have been anticipated. "The greater the hazard,
the greater the care required."88 The court should repudiate all ref-
erence to the fiction of implied invitation and "attractive nuisance" and
affirm the principle that recovery be based entirely on general principles
of negligence.
LENNOX P. MCLENDON, JR.
Trusts-Inheritance by Murderer-The Constructive Trust
and a Statutory Solution*
In a recent case,1 the Georgia Supreme Court decided that a hus-
band inherited his wife's estate under the statute of descent and dis-
tribution in spite of the fact that he had murdered her, holding that
it was not justified in reading into a clear and unconditional statute an
exception denying the right of a murderer to inherit from his victim.
Statutes of descent and distribution and the Statute of Wills gen-
erally contain no such exception, and in the absence of other specific
"
7 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §339, comment a (1934). Gimmestad v. Rose Bros.
Co., 194 Minn. 531, 261 N. W. 194 (1935).
' Gimmestad v. Rose Bros. Co., 194 Minn. 531, 536, 261 N. W. 194, 196
(1935). At page 536, 261 N. W. 194, 196, the court continues: "Nothing more
is needed to support the proposition that one who maintains on his premises an
artificial condition is liable for resulting injury to young children trespassing
thereon if:
'(a) The place where the condition is maintained is one upon -which the
possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass, and
'(b) The condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and
which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily injury to such children, and
'(c) The children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the area made
dangerous by it, and
'(d) The utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as
compared to the risk to young children involved therein.' RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(Tentative Draft No. 4) §209 [RESTATEMENT, TORTS §339 (1934)]."
* The closely related problems arising in the fields of insurance, bank deposits,
and other property relationships are outside the scope of this note.
1 Crumley v. Hall, 43 S. E. 2d 646 (Ga. 1947).
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legislative declaration on the matter, a number of cases 2 have reached
the same result as the Georgia decision on the grounds that the devolu-
tion of property is completely controlled by statute and to make an
exception thereto would be judicial legislation. Some courts3 have also
felt that a denial of the right to inherit would constitute a forfeiture of
estate for conviction of crime in violation of statutory or constitutional
provisions. On the other hand, several cases 4 have denied the right
of a murderer to take from his victim by descent or devise, reasoning
that the legislature could not have intended to let a murderer so acquire
property when it enacted the statute and that the statute must be con-
strued with reference to the common law principle that no man may
profit from his own wrong. Neither view is satisfactory; the first
allows the murderer to acquire property by his crime, while the second
involves the reading of implied exceptions into an unambiguous and
peremptory statute.
Conceding that under the law a murderer may acquire property by
his crime, and this appears to be the sounder of the two views men-
tioned,5 was the court in the instant case bound to let him retain it?
Several writers6 have suggested the use of a constructive trust to resolve
this problem. This device has been employed by a few courts7 and
incorporated into the RESTATEmENT OF R-STITUTION. 8 The North Car-
' E.g., Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N. E. 784 (1894); McAllister v.
Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906); Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 993, 185
S. W. 487 (1916) ; Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N. W. 935 (1894),
reversing 31 Neb. 61, 47 N. W. 700; Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794
(1888) (dower) ; In re Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637 (1895) ; Hill
v. Noland, - Tex. Civ. App. - , 149 S. W. 288 (1912). Note that all the
above cases involve intestacy. See cases collected in 3 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES §478, n. 27 (1946).
'E.g., Wilson v. Randolph, 50 Nev. 371, 261 Pac. 654 (1927); Owens v.
Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1888) (dower); In re Carpenter's Estate,
170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637 (1895).
'E.g., Weaver v. Hollis, - Ala. - , 22 So. 2d 525 (1945) (intestacy);
Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 Atl. 470 (1935) (intestacy); Perry v. Straw-
bridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S. W. 641 (1908) (intestacy, followed in Eisenhardt v.
Siegel, 342 Mo. 22, 119 S. W. 2d 810 [1938]) ; Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506,
22 N. E. 188 (1889) (will); Re Estate of Edith Wilkins, 192 Wis. 111, 211
N. W. 652 (1927) (will); in the Estate of Hall (1914) Probate 1 (C. A.)
(England). And see cases collected in 3 BoGr, TRUSTS AND TRUSTES §478,
n. 30 (1946).
AMES, LECTUREs ON LEGAL HisToRY 310-12 (1913); Note, 8 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Rav. 492 (1931).
' Ames, op. cit. supra note 5 at 310 (1913) ; Notes, 9 Iu.. L. REv. 505 (1915);
4 HARV. L. REv. 394 (1891); 8 HARv. L. REV. 170 (1896); 29 MIcHi. L. REv. 745
(1931); 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 100 (1931).
'E.g., Whitney v. Lott, 134 N. J. Eq. 596, 36 A. 2d 888 (Ct. of Ch. 1944)
(will) ; Sherman v. Weber, 113 N. J. Eq. 45, 167 At1. 517 (Ct. of Ch. 1933)
(tenancy by the entirety); Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540
(1896) (in effect overruling Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188
[1889]); Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1918)
(tenancy by the entirety) ; Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927)
(tenancy by the entirety).
'§187: (1) Where a devisee or legatee murders the testator; he holds the
1948]
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olina Supreme Court in Bryant v. Bryant imposed a constructive trust
on property in the hands of a tenant by the entirety who had murdered
his spouse, but has not yet had occasibn to employ it in a case involving
a will or intestacy.
Equity, in preventing unjust enrichment, has long used the con-
structive trust to deprive one of property wrongfully acquired, and it
has been pointed out that acquisition of property by murder presents
an apt case for the application of this remedy."" By its use the ob-
jections to reading implied exceptions into a statute are avoided, for
the trust is imposed on the property after it reaches the hands of the
murderer. The argument that a denial of the right to inherit consti-
tutes a forfeiture of estate is inappropriate here because there is no
such denial, the statute being allowed to operate in the normal manner.
And it would appear that the contention in an Illinois case" that the
imposition of a constructive trust constitutes such a forfeiture is un-
tenable because this is a civil action, not criminal, and the trust is
imposed not as a punishment for his crime as such, but because the
murderer has been unjustly enriched.12  If the means by which prop-
erty is acquired are such as to shock the conscience of equity, it would
appear irrelevant that they also constitute an offense punishable in a
criminal action. At any rate, those courts employing the constructive
trust have not been concerned with any violation of constitutional pro-
hibitions. This remedy renders any distinction between devise and
descent unnecessary,' 3 and motive immaterial,14 because it does not de-
pend upon the terms of any statute or contract nor upon any particular
fact situation, but is a remedial device intended to prevent unjust
enrichment whenever and wherever found. An advantage of the con-
structive trust is the fact that bona fide purchasers without notice from
the murderer are protected since equity will not raise a trust against
such innocent parties, but will instead raise it on the proceeds of the
property devised or bequeathed to him upon a constructive trust for the persons
who would have been entitled to the property upon the death of the testator if the
devise or bequest had been revoked. (2) Where a person is murdered by his heir
or next of kin and dies intestate, the heir or next of kin holds the property thus
acquired upon a constructive trust for the person or persons who would have been
heirs or next of kin if he had predeceased the intestate.
§188: Where two or more persons have an interest in property and the interest
.of one of them is enlarged by his murder of the other, to the extent to which it
is enlarged, he holds it upon a constructive trust for the estate of the other.
193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927), commented upon in 5 N. C. L. REv. 373
(1927).
"°Ames, op. cit. supra note 5 at 316 (1913); Note, 30 HARV. L. REv. 622
(1917).
' Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N. E. 784 (1894).
" RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §187, comment c (1937).
13Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1918); Bryant
v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927).14 See note 13 supra.
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sale in the hands of the murderer. The persons entitled to invoke equity's
aid would appear to be those persons who would have inherited had
the murderer predeceased his victim, or, in case of wills, those persons
who would have taken had the bequest or devise to the murderer been
revoked, 15 since the murderer by his act has made his contingent right
absolute thus destroying any possibility that they might succeed to the
victim's estate.
The Georgia Supreme Court would have reached a much sounder
result, in accord with the letter of the 'law and fundamental principles
of equity, had it declared the murderer a constructive trustee of the
property inherited.'
Many states have enacted statutes on this subject,' 7 some for the
specific purpose of overruling judicial decisions allowing the murderer
to inherit. In general, these statutes declare that a murderer may not
take any property, real or personal, from his victim by descent or
devise, but there are variations as to types of devolution affected,
18
crimes included,'0 and requirements of conviction.
20
The North Carolina legislature, after the decision in Owens v.
Owens2x holding that a wife who murdered her husband could not be
denied her dower because only the legislature could prescribe additional
grounds for forfeiture of a statutory right, enacted three statutes.2  The
statutes provide that a spouse convicted of the murder or as an acces-
sory before the fact of the murder of the other shall lose all rights in
the other's personal estate, including the right of administration, a
year's provision, and a distributive share thereof and further shall lose
all right to dower or curtesy and all. rights to property settled on the
deceased solely by reason of the marriage. It will be noted that the
statutes apply only to the husband-wife relation and do not apply to
other realty descending in intestacy or to any property rights conferred
by will. A revisal of the statutes is needed to broaden their scope both
"See RFSTATEmENT, RESTITUTION §187 (1937); Note, 30 HAgv. L. REv. 622
(1917)." For an historical treatment of the problem, see Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty-
History of the Problem in Anglo-American Law, 19 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 229
(1942), and Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty in New York, I, 11, 20 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. 270, 424 (1945).
'7 See statutes collected in 3 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusEs §478, n. 32 (1946).
ISE.g., CAL. PROD. CODE (Deering, 1941) §258 (applying to intestacy only);
MIss. CODE ANN. (1942) §672 (applying only 
to wills).
"0 E.g., CoLo. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 2, §258 (applying only to murder); KAN.
GEN. STAT. (Corrick, 1933) §22-133 (including manslaughter).
"
0E.g., S. C. CODE (1942) §8874 (conviction of crime necessary); VA. CODE
(Michie et al., 1942) §5274 (no conviction required), and see Ward v. Ward,
174 Va. 331, 6 S. E. 2d 664 (1940) (wherein acquitted murderer was proved
guilty of unlawful homicide in a civil action under the statute, but held not to
have forfeited estate because his motive in committing the murder was not to
acquire property)." Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1888).
21 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§28-10, 30-4, 52-19.
1948]
236 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW (V91.26
as to persons and rights affected. It is believed that the following would
suffice for this purpose:
No person convicted of the murder of another, or as an accessory
before the fact of such murder, shall take any right, title, or interest
in the victim's property, real or personal, by descent, survivorship,
devise, or bequest: Provided that in cases of intestacy or survivorship
such property shall descend to those who would be lawfully entitled
thereto had the murderer predeceased his victim, and in cases of
devise or bequest shall pass to the persons who would have taken had
the devise or bequest to the murderer been revoked. 23
CHARLES D. POWERS.
*2 See comprehensive statute suggested and discussed in Wade, Acquisition of
Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARv. L. REv.
715 (1936).
